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ORIGINALIST IDEOLOGY AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Ian Bartrum* 
In July of 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese addressed the na-
tional convention of the American Bar Association with hopes of in-
spiring a fundamental change in constitutional interpretation.1  He 
railed against the Supreme Court’s unprincipled turn towards a “ju-
risprudence of idiosyncrasy,” lamented recent decisions as “more pol-
icy choices than articulations of constitutional principle,” and called 
urgently on the Justices to adopt “a coherent jurisprudential stance,” 
lest a “constitution in the true sense” cease to exist.2  Meese had a 
particular stance in mind, and, to no one’s surprise, it was not a re-
turn to the Warren Court’s brand of “radical egalitarianism.”3  Ra-
ther, he claimed that the only interpretive theory adequate to protect 
our democratic institutions and the rule of law is “a jurisprudence of 
original intention.”4  Of course, most such attempts to initiate broad 
interpretive change have fairly limited effect, but Meese’s speech 
seemed to engage an idea whose time had come, and, in retrospect, it 
helped bring about something of a sea change in constitutional theo-
ry.  To wit, Justice Antonin Scalia recently reflected that, unlike cir-
cumstances at the time of his appointment, “[o]riginalism is [now] in 
the game, even if it does not always prevail.”5  And, a little over a dec-
ade after Meese’s speech, Laurence Tribe would summarize some of 
Ronald Dworkin’s thoughts with what has become a contemporary 
ubiquity: “We are all originalists now.”6 
While Meese certainly did not invent originalism, his speech un-
doubtedly helped revive an approach that had fallen into some dis-
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use.  Perhaps nowhere is this resurgence more evident than in the le-
gal academy, where Meese contemporaries like Raoul Berger7 and 
Robert Bork8 have passed the torch to a younger generation of “New 
Originalists,” who have abandoned the archaeology of “original in-
tentions” and now search for various forms of “original public mean-
ing.”9  This “new” originalism concedes that intentions are not mean-
ing, and recognizes that, to the extent that history should inform 
constitutional interpretation, the relevant moment is ratification and 
not drafting.10  Contemporary originalists have also generally come to 
accept that constitutional language may be underdetermined, and 
thus concede that modern interpreters will sometimes need to “con-
struct” legal rules in ways that rely on “something other than original 
meaning.”11  Nonetheless, most modern originalists believe that orig-
inal meaning must contribute something quite substantial to consti-
tutional interpretation.12  Indeed, Larry Solum—perhaps the most in-
clusive of the New Originalists—has argued that almost all originalists 
share two essential commitments: (1) the fixation thesis, which claims 
that constitutional meaning is “fixed” or “frozen” at a particular mo-
ment in time; and (2) a reasonably strong version of the contribution 
thesis, which holds that, absent weighty reasons, this fixed meaning 
must “constrain” modern interpretive decisions.13 
In earlier work, I have attacked the first of these commitments, 
and I continue to believe that with ordinary language usage—
particularly vague usage—meaning is not the sort of thing that can be 
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 9 See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
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 12 See id. at 32. 
 13 Id. at 34. 
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“fixed.”14  And some key constitutional clauses certainly present them-
selves as ordinary language constructions.15  In this essay, however, I 
turn my attention to the second originalist commitment—the so-
called “contribution thesis.”  Assuming here that constitutional mean-
ing could be fixed in time, I contend that, Ed Meese notwithstanding, 
it is actually the contribution thesis—at least in its strong forms—that 
compromises the rule of law.  Originalism of this type would have 
“historical understandings” displace the judiciary as the principal ex-
positor of legal meanings.16  One of the core features of the American 
conception of the rule of law is that it is the law—not the lawgiver or 
her intentions—that obligates us, and, when the text is vague, an in-
stitutionalized judiciary is authorized to act as its interpreter.  The in-
terposition of a binding historical exegetist between the text and the 
judge thus compromises the basic structural commitments of Ameri-
can democracy.  We should therefore understand this sort of original-
ism as a political ideology and not a theory of the Constitution as it ex-
ists.17 
VAGUENESS AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Quarrels about textual meaning rarely arise over determinate con-
stitutional provisions like the Presidential age requirement.  In such 
cases, the relevant linguistic rules are suitably precise and our prac-
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Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 08-12, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1130665 (“But when we disagree about [the linguistic meaning or semantic con-
tent of the Constitution] we are disagreeing about linguistic facts.  In principle, there is a 
fact of the matter about what the linguistic content is.”). 
 15 See Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, in INTERPRETING LAW AND 
LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER 133, 134–36 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux 
eds., 1988) (discussing the hybrid nature of constitutional language).  Specialized or 
technical language usages rely on either an expert language community or the stipulation 
of definitions and/or applications.  Id.  The Constitution was, of course, submitted to “the 
People,” and contains little in the way of stipulated definitions.  See, e.g., Akhil Reed Am-
ar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 
1657–59 (1997) (discussing populist nature of constitutional ratification). 
 16 For an enlightening discussion of this problem, see SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE 
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2012) (on file with author). 
 17 This fundamental insight is Sean Wilson’s.  See id. at 149–50.  I hope here only to think 
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tices well enough settled that the law essentially speaks for itself.  It is 
rather the underdetermined or vague constitutional language that 
gives us trouble, exactly because the underlying rules and practices 
governing its meaning are themselves imprecise and controversial.  
Logically speaking, the problem is straightforward: a vague proposi-
tion may have no determinate truth value.18  Whether it is true, for 
example, that a particular kind of legal protection is “equal” to an-
other depends upon how we measure equality, and it may be the case 
that two perfectly reasonable kinds of measurement yield contradic-
tory results.  And so we cannot, as David Lewis says, “pick a delinea-
tion once and for all . . . but must consider the entire range of rea-
sonable delineations.”19  Thus, unlike the Presidential Age Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause cannot speak for itself, and so requires an 
interpreter.  In our legal tradition, that job lies with the judge, who 
may consider and adopt any reasonable measurement to decide a 
given case.  Originalist ideology, however, makes “historical under-
standing” superior to the judge, and would thus confine “equal” to 
reasonable historical measurements.  This, I contend, is at odds with 
well-accepted ideas about the rule of law. 
Without a working account of the “rule of law,” of course, this fi-
nal assertion only begs the question, and so to better define the con-
cept I turn to Brian Tamanaha’s thoughtful descriptive efforts.20  In a 
recent lecture, Tamanaha summarized some of his earlier work with a 
“thin” definition—“[t]he rule of law means that government officials 
and citizens are bound by and abide by the law”—which he fleshed 
out with three core “themes” or “notions” of usage and practice: (1) 
“government is limited by law”; (2) “formal legality”; and (3) “[t]he 
 
 18 The late and eminent David Lewis summarized the issue well: 
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no 
determinate truth value.  Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line.  
Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary between 
bald and not-bald, the sentence is true.  Relative to other delineations, no less rea-
sonable, it is false.  Nothing in our use of language makes one of these delinea-
tions right and all the others wrong.  We cannot pick a delineation once and for 
all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider the entire 
range of reasonable delineations. 
  DAVID LEWIS, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 244 
(1983). 
 19 Id.  “Reasonable” here points towards the accepted practical usage conventions, which 
may, again, be underdetermined. 
 20 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004); 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, (Washington Univ. in St. 
Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 12-02-07, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012845. 
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rule of law, not man.”21  The American embodiment of the first 
theme is a semi-independent prosecuting branch and a structural di-
vision of government that gives “the judiciary the capacity to hold the 
other parts answerable on legal grounds.”22  The second theme pro-
motes predictability by demanding that laws be published in advance, 
that they not “demand the impossible,” and that they be generally 
applicable “according to their terms.”23  The third theme requires 
that neutral principles supersede individual caprice, enforcement of 
which, in the American model, remains “the special preserve of judg-
es,” who must be “unbiased” and “loyal to the law alone.”24  These 
three core themes provide a useful framework against which we can 
assess and explore my claim that originalist ideology subverts the rule 
of law. 
I will consider the second theme—“formal legality”—first, both 
because it underpins the other themes, and because it is in assessing 
this notion that the fundamental problem with originalism becomes 
most clear.  Leaving aside the problem of laws that demand the im-
possible,25 formal legality requires that the laws be set forth in ad-
vance and bind all according to their published terms.  These re-
quirements ensure that the laws are predictable and provide notice to 
all.  Originalist interpretive ideologies, however, compromise both 
these guiding principles and their purposes.  Indeed, in many cases, 
originalism does not treat the prior published text as law at all.  Rather, the 
published text and terms act only as a placeholder for some set of “his-
torical understandings,” which in fact contain the relevant legal con-
tent.26  As a crude illustration, imagine a Yellow Pages entry that simp-
ly refers the user to a different location: “Cinemas: See Theaters.”  In 
the context of originalist ideology this might become, “Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment: See Penal Codes, 1789.”  Under such a theory, 
we bar those younger than thirty-five from the Presidency based on 
the public meaning of “the Age of thirty five Years”27 in 1789—not 
 
 21 Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 2, 3, 8.  Tamanaha considers each of 
these themes in a great deal more depth in his book on the subject.  See TAMANAHA, ON 
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 114–26. 
 22 Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 14. 
 23 Id. at 15. 
 24 Id. at 22. 
 25 In this context, however, it is interesting to think about recent “positive right” constitu-
tions—such as South Africa’s—that may ask their governments to meet impossible de-
mands.  See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 26–27 (guaranteeing access to minimum housing 
and health care). 
 26 Sean Wilson has argued that such a view treats the text as a “gesture,” or something akin 
to a religious sacrament, in which meaning lies somewhere beyond the actual utterance.  
WILSON, supra note 16, at 35–36. 
 27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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because there is broad agreement on that phrase’s public meaning 
today.  For originalists, then, the Constitution’s published terms are 
not actually the law, which is instead hidden in a set of extra-legal his-
torical norms and conceptions.28  This compromises both the law’s 
“formal” character and the goals of notice and predictability, and 
thus subverts the rule of law as we understand that idea. 
So what are we to do with vague constitutional language, which 
seems to be somewhat unpredictable all by itself?  The answer is sim-
ple, if unsatisfying to some.  Formal legality requires us to treat vague 
published language as the law, even if it is less predictable than other, 
more determinate provisions.  It must be the published terms them-
selves—not some hidden set of historical conceptions—which bind us 
moving forward.  In a government dedicated to the rule of law, the 
lawmaker who hopes to bind future generations to specific or deter-
minate legal conceptions must make those conceptions explicit in the 
enacted text.  There is a difference, in other words, between declar-
ing that the President must be “mature” and requiring that he “have 
attained to the Age of thirty five Years,”29 and formal legality requires 
us to recognize the law in the particular form that it appears.  When 
that form is vague or underdetermined, we must accept that the law 
leaves questions of specific application or conception to its designat-
ed interpreter, which brings us to the other two themes underlying 
the rule of law. 
Tamanaha’s remaining themes—“government limited by law” and 
“rule of law, not man”—speak to related ideas about the function and 
limits of the judiciary under the rule of law.  Our constitutional struc-
ture works to ensure that law limits the government by dividing au-
thority among several branches, and by empowering the judicial 
branch to hold the legislative and executive branches to account.  As 
Tamanaha says, this architecture makes the interpretation and appli-
cation of law “the special preserve of judges,”30 and I suggest that ef-
forts to divest the judiciary of this authority—or to constrain it in the 
service of extra-legal policy preferences—compromise the structural 
means by which we have sought to limit government by law.  Indeed, 
Miguel Schor has observed that a weakened, politicized judiciary is 
 
 28 Ronald Dworkin has famously made the distinction between a concept and its conceptions: 
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly.  I 
no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would 
not accept that my “meaning” was limited to these examples . . . . I might say that I 
meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific concep-
tion of fairness I might have had in mind. 
  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977). 
 29 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 30 Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 22. 
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among the “key features of . . . the un-rule of law” in developing na-
tions.31  And this is exactly the danger of an interpretive ideology that 
makes judicial interpretation subservient to “historical understand-
ings,” which in turn promote the conceptual preferences of a past 
culture.  Thus, originalist ideologies, at least those that depend upon 
strong versions of the contribution thesis, not only violate the princi-
ple of formal legality, they also subvert our efforts to limit govern-
ment by law.  It is for these reasons that I contend that originalism is 
inconsistent with the rule of law, and suggest that we must leave judg-
es free to engage all reasonable interpretive strategies in fulfilling 
their constitutional role. 
Of course, entrusting judges with such broad authority presents its 
own substantial risks to the rule of law, particularly when courts are 
called upon to interpret vague constitutional language in concrete 
cases.  There is the danger, as Tamanaha points out, “that the rule of 
law might become rule by judges”; that is, if the courts cannot remain 
politically neutral and “loyal to the law alone,” we might just as easily 
find ourselves subject to the arbitrary whim of a judge as of any other 
person.32  Indeed, it is precisely this danger that has led Ed Meese and 
others to endorse the binding constraint of originalist ideology.  But, 
as I have demonstrated above, this kind of extra-legal constraint is in-
consistent with other broadly accepted notions about the rule of law, 
and so it cannot provide the sort of remedy that originalists are seek-
ing.  This is not to say that judges are, or should be, completely un-
constrained in their decision-making.  Rather, they must operate 
within the accepted norms governing constitutional interpretive prac-
tice.33  Historical arguments are certainly an important part of that 
practice, but, in keeping with the rule of law, we cannot treat them as 
the only permissible—or even the strongly preferred—grounds of judicial 
interpretation.  If history is to constrain interpretation, it must be be-
cause the judge so decides in a particular case, not because the con-
tribution thesis—or any external normative construct—categorically 
commands it. 
 
 31 Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES 1329, 1330 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).  Along these same lines, David 
Strauss has recently argued that originalism compromises the candor and Burkean legit-
imacy inherent in our longstanding common law tradition.  See DAVID STRAUSS, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION 43–46 (2010). 
 32 Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 22, 24 (emphasis in original). 
 33 Philip Bobbitt has provided an excellent account of these norms as “modalities” of consti-
tutional argument.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1982). 
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BEYOND THE DEAD HAND PROBLEM 
This objection to originalism—call it the “legality objection” for 
short—is both more and less than the so-called (and much re-
hearsed) “dead hand problem,” and explaining why may help clarify 
my claim.  The claim is more because, while “dead hand” theories 
generally suggest that originalism results in undemocratic applica-
tions of law, the “legality objection” contends that binding original-
ism does not treat the Constitution as law at all.34  The claim is less because 
I do not suggest that the “dead hand” of the past cannot bind us in 
democratically legitimate ways—this is, after all, an essential feature 
of law’s authority—but, rather, that it must do so through the text and 
not by resort to extra-legal historical norms. 
To explore these distinctions in more depth, we need a working 
account of the “dead hand” problem, and Reva Siegel has offered as 
good a summary as any: 
It has been hundreds of years since the Constitution was ratified.  No one 
alive today participated in the ratification process.  The cumbersome su-
permajority rules of Article V make amending the Constitution so much 
more difficult than other forms of legislative change that, since ratifica-
tion of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution has been amended less than 
twenty times.  The living have not assented to Article V as the sole meth-
od of constitutional change.  And if we are to construe the living as hav-
ing implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrange-
ment, it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many 
pathways of change.35 
The objection is thus to originalism’s democratic legitimacy as an inter-
pretive practice given the (perhaps unintended) insurmountability of 
Article V’s amendment hurdles.36  The difficulty of amendment 
makes the Constitution’s normative commitments practically unas-
sailable, and thus largely unaccountable to the American people.  In 
our political theory and tradition, of course, government derives its 
“just powers from the consent of the governed,”37 and so, to preserve 
democratic legitimacy, the Supreme Court should provide an Article 
 
 34 Again, at least this much of the “legality objection” derives directly from Sean Wilson’s 
work.  See WILSON, supra note 16, at 149 (“[I]t makes no sense to set forth a constitution 
as ‘the law,’ yet retain some other mysterious entity from the past that controls who wins 
or loses the cases, and what the hidden principles are.”). 
 35 Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 
1399, 1404–05 (2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 36 For an interesting take on Article V’s “imbecilic” design, see Sanford Levinson, Our Imbe-
cilic Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/05/28/our-imbecilic-constitution. 
 37 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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V workaround by interpreting the Constitution as a “living” docu-
ment. 
The essential claim here is that the Constitution suffers from a se-
rious and probably permanent design defect: Article V.  Notice that if 
the Constitution were more easily amended the “dead hand” problem 
would largely dissolve, just as Raoul Berger supposed was true back in 
1981: “[o]f course the dead cannot bind us; nor did they seek to do 
so.  Instead, the Framers provided us with an instrument of change—
amendment pursuant to Article V.”38  In such a circumstance, pre-
sumably, those who rely solely on the “dead hand” objection would 
have no problem with a strong version of originalism.  For them the 
problem with binding originalism is contextual and not categorical.  It is 
our peculiar, flawed Constitution—not the theory itself—that makes 
originalist approaches problematic.  In this sense the “legality objec-
tion” claims more than the “dead hand problem”; indeed, it is categor-
ical.  Even if we could readily modify constitutional terms to suit the 
living, the “legality objection” claims that approaches that would bind 
us to extra-legal “historical understandings” of the text are always in-
consistent with the rule of law. 
I have also said that the “legality objection” is less than the “dead 
hand problem,” and we are now in a better position to see why.  Un-
like “dead hand” complaints, the “legality objection” does not claim 
that efforts to bind future generations through law pose a threat to 
democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, as I have said, this is a central feature 
of law’s claim to authority: present enactments—if made pursuant to 
suitably democratic secondary rules—will impose legitimate future 
obligations.  In other words, even if the Framers had chosen to omit 
Article V entirely, or had expressly made the Constitution unamenda-
ble (as in the case of Senate apportionment),39 the “legality objection” 
has no quarrel with past majorities binding present ones—provided 
they do so explicitly through law.  The objection, rather, is to an ide-
ology that would interpose extra-textual historical understandings or 
norms between the modern reader and the law itself.  If, for example, 
the Presidential age requirement were as unpopular today as is the 
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment excludes women, presumably 
“dead hand” theorists would find both rules equally lacking in demo-
cratic legitimacy.  Not so the “legality objection,” which holds that any 
duly enacted law properly binds future generations to the plain 
meaning of its published terms. 
 
 38 Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981). 
 39 Article V, of course, expressly provides “that no State, without its Consent, shall be de-
prived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the title and throughout this essay, I have referred to original-
ism as an “ideology” and have suggested that, despite rhetorical re-
course to philosophical terms like “speaker’s meaning” and “semantic 
content,”40 originalism is not an account of how our Constitution has 
meaning in a culture dedicated to the rule of law.  What I mean by 
this is that originalism, by virtue of the contribution thesis, is an orga-
nized normative effort to bring about a fundamental change in our existing 
political structure by making judges subservient to extra-legal con-
straints that generally advance a particular policy agenda.  I hope I 
have demonstrated that this ideology undermines broadly accepted 
notions about the rule of law, and so—no matter how tempted we are 
to bring “unfettered” judicial discretion under greater political con-
trol—binding external constraints on legal interpretive practices are 
a cure worse than the disease.  We must accept that both the rule of 
law and our constitutional structure entrust judges with great authori-
ty and responsibility, and we must hope that our legal practices—in 
courtrooms, boardrooms, and classrooms—can cultivate and main-
tain an interpretive culture that honors our most important demo-
cratic ideals. 
 
 40 I refer here to the description Larry Solum has offered in his highly influential account of 
“semantic originalism.”  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 9, at 34–37 (citing 
PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989)). 
